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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF Case No. 
UTAH, a body politic, and MOUN- 7884 
TAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corpo- ~ 
ration, I 
Defendants. ) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT MOUNTAIN 
STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties herein may be designated as follows : de-
fendant Public Service Commission of Utah as "the Com-
mission", the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company as "the Company", and Ogden City as "the City." 
Emphasis has been supplied. 
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There is no substantial question of fact in this case. 
We believe that the issues of law may be determined 
by the consideration of certain simple basic propositions. 
An understanding of such issues requires that attention be 
fixed upon the relevant facts and that other matters be set 
to one side. Because we believe that the statement of the 
City does not focus attention upon the essential facts, the 
Company presents the following statement: 
The operations of the Company necessarily involve 
revenue and expense. We have here under consideration a 
particular class of company expense, namely expenditures 
which it makes and must make to cities and towns in this 
State in the discharge of franchise, excise and occupational 
taxes and similar impositions and the so-called free service 
which the Company has agreed to render to certain munici-
palities (R. 109). These impositions and so-called free ser- 1 
vice will be referred to collectively in this brief as "munici- ' 
pal levies". 
Included within and typical of such municipal levies-
is the money which the Company must pay to the City and . 
the free service which it has agreed to render to the City 
under a franchise and agreement of 1941. The franchcise; 
(R. 21) provides in part that 
"Section 4. In lieu of all license, franchise, oc-:i 
cupation and other similar taxes, the Company shall., 
pay to the City of Ogden upon passage, approval and' 
acceptance of this ordinance, an amount equal to onett 
per cent ( 1%) of the total exchange revenue derived·:; 
from telephones located within the Ogden city lim· 
its." 
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3 
The agreement (R. 22) provides in part that 
~ 
/ 
"Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany will provide your city (Ogden City) with the 
following: 
"1. Twenty-four individual Line Flat 
Rate Business telephones, or the equivalent, un-
til the population reaches 50,000, and one indi-
vidual Line Flat Rate Business telephone, or the 
equivalent, for each additional 5,000 population 
over 50,000 up to a maximum of 100,000 popula-
tion. 
"2. We will also furnish the city police 
department with toll service not to exceed 
$600.00 per year." 
The annual value of said free service for the year 1952 is 
estimated by the Company to be equal to .44 per cent of the 
Company's gross local exchange revenue in Ogden for that 
year, making the annual franchise tax and the value of free 
service equal to 1.44 per cent of the Company's 1952 esti-
mated gross exchange revenues received from the Ogden 
City customers of the Company (R. 18-125). , 
The relationship arising in connection with the impo-
sition of municipal levies and the payment of the same is 
a relationship, however, entirely between the Company on 
the one hand and the cities and towns throughout the State, 
including Ogden City, on the other hand. The telephone 
customers are not a party to the imposition of these munici-
' pal levies, and the duty of the payment of the same rests 
~entirely upon the Company (R. 161-62, 181). 
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While this case relates to the matter of this particular 
kind of company expense, neither the proposed tariff of 
the Company nor the order of the Commission here under 
review disturbs or impairs the relationship between the 
Company and Ogden City or any other city or town impos-
ing upon the C9mpany the obligation to discharge municipal 
levies (R. 161-64). This case is not concerned with the 
imposition of municipal levies nor with the obligation or 
duty of the Company to discharge such levies. This case is, 
however, directly and necessarily concerned with the matter 
of the source of certain company revenue; and the proposed 
company tariff and the order of the Commission here under 
review undertake to provide and prescribe the sources of 
company revenue to pay these levies. Thus the relation-
ship to which this case applies is the relationship between 
the Company on the one hand and its customers on the 
other hand (R. 161-64). In the apparent failure of the City 
to perceive these facts lies its fundamental misconception 
of the nature of the proposal of the Company and the order 
of the Commission. 
The only source of revenue which the Company has is 
from its customers (R. 128). The money which the Com-
pany receives from its customers for intrastate telephone 
service is derived from rates which the Company publishes 
and files with the Commission (R. 161-64). The determina-
tion of these rates and charges is one of the important func-
tions and duties of the Commission and is a subject of its 1 
jurisdiction (R. 33). 
In the past the Company has obtained the money with 
i 
which to pay its expenses, including municipal levies, from 
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its customers on a state-wide basis (R. 110). The mechan-
ics of fixing exchange rates has been to divide the telephone 
exchanges of the State into groupings based upon the num-
ber of customers within an exchange and to fix rates 
uniform \\ithin each group of exchanges throughout the 
State (R. 129). In making such rates the Commission has 
fixed the same at levels sufficient to provide overall revenue 
to the Company high enough to pay all of the Company's 
expense and in addition thereto to provide a return on the 
·- Company's properties at the percentage fixed by the Com-
~ mission (R. 119). Thus these state-wide rates provided 
-· moneys with which to pay all of the expenses of the Com-
- pany, including the municipal levies here involved. The 
. . effect of these rates was therefore such that the telephone 
bill of a customer living within a city or town which im-
~: posed no municipal levy included a portion of the amount 
.-. required by the Company to be paid to other cities and towns 
;.:::; levying such impositions (R. 110). 
Under the tariff involved in this case, the Company 
proposes that it will no longer obtain the money with which 
:::· to pay municipal levies from all of its customers, but rather 
_...- that it will, so far as practicable, derive money for such 
:::·::.purpose from its customers on a prorata basis within the 
::"- respective communities where the municipal levies are im-
::_;;. posed (R. 110) . 
. / 
-:;.-- When these municipal levies were first imposed ·upon 
~;::::the Company they were so nominal that the amounts in-
volved would have had no appreciable effect upon the rates 
~~paid by the users of telephone service throughout the State. 
~'~ 
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No substantial change occurred in the extent of these taxes 
for many years. The Company now finds that these levies 
are rising sharply and today present a serious tax problem 
(R. 117). 
At the time of hearing before the Commission, in forty-
six cities and towns within the State municipal levies were 
imposed on the Company, estimated by it for the year 1952 
to be equal to percentages of its gross exchange revenue 
within such municipalities ranging from .39 per cent in 
Midvale to 7.28 per cent in Scofield (R. 18-Exhibit 2). 
In thirty other cities and towns the amount of municipal 
levies in the same period was so small that when related · 
to the lowest priced service within the exchange would not 
produce a charge of one cent per month (R. 19-Exhibit 
2). In ninety-four cities, towns and communities no munici-
pal levies were then imposed (R. 20-Exhibit. 2). So-called 
free service is rendered by the Company to each county in 
the State where it has exchanges except Washington. This 
county free service is, however, spread quite uniformly 
throughout the State; it represents a small item of overall 
expense, and the Company does not regard the practice of 
including this expense in its state-wide rates as being dis-
criminatory. The Company does not propose that the tariff 
here involved shall have any effect upon the so-called free 
service currently being rendered to counties (R. 121). 
With respect to municipal levies, however, the Com-
pany has reason to believe that the present disparity in the 
rate of imposition in the respective cities will continue and 
may become greater as time goes on (R. 117). The Com-
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7 
pany has no means of anticipating what city may next call 
upon it for the payment of such levy or what the rate may 
be (R. 116). 
The Company therefore reached the decision that its 
t practice of including municipal levies in its state-wide rates 
1 
,. was unjust and discriminatory and that the removal of 
I -- such discriminatory practice required the adoption of its 
I !l proposed tariff, whereby money for the payment of such 
r1 levies would be collected, so far as practicable, where im-
posed (R. 116-117). The Commission found that the prac-
1 !:: tice of including the expenses of municipal levies in state-
!! wide rates was unjust and discriminatory (R. 28-29) and 
f•- ordered the Company to file a tariff for the recovery pro-
~C..: rata of municipal levies within the cities and towns where 
1 
111 imposed (R. 35) . 
. ~ There is no doubt or uncertainty as to the nature of the 
a,: tariff which the Commission's order authorized the Com-
~ · pany to file. It is a tariff dealing simply and exclusively 
1 ~~ with revenue. This is clear from the testimony of Mr. 
~=· Sawyer in answer to questions from Mr. Thain of the Com-· 
lf:ft mission's staff (R. 161) as follows: 
"Q. Now, what do you propose to do with your 
municipal taxes if the proposal you now make is ap-
proved by the Commission? 
"A. Well, this particular tax, as I mentioned, 
is imposed upon the Telephone Company, and as such 
is an expense against our operations the same as 
other general operating expenses. So, we propose 
to add this additional expense to our regular tariff ' 
rates in those towns where this particular expense is 
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imposed. In other words; it amounts to varying our 
schedules to the extent of this expense in these towns. 
"Q. In other words, all of the tax which you will 
bill will in effect become a revenue? That is, it will 
be credited to the revenue account of the company? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And the tax payments will show up as a 
tax expense in the tax accounts of the company? 
"A. Yes ; that is the way it is accounted for 
now. In picking up the revenue for this expense in 
connection with our present state-wide schedules it 
is a revenue, and there will be no change in the ac-
counting for that particular revenue over the way 
we do it now." 
And again at R. 162 as follows: 
"Q. What you mean to say is that in the past 
any municipal taxes have been included as part of 
your overall expenses in determining the setting of 
rates? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Which this Commission has authorized you 
to charge? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And accordingly, anything that was in 
there then, theoretically at least, is in your revenue 
now? 
"A. That's right. 
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"Q. But insofar as practical in the future you 
are going to kind of isolate it and add it on to your 
bill here? 
"A. Yes; we will determine what that expense 
, is in each town and adjust the rates in that particular 
town to take care of that expense. That takes it out 
of your state-wide rate schedules then." 
The Company did not, however, propose at this time 
to disturb its state-wide rate schedules previously author-
ized (R. 118-119). The operation of the tariff in question 
in connection with existing state-wide rate schedules would 
therefore improve slightly (about .21 per cent) the earn-
ings of the Company. This improvement would raise the 
Company's earnings on the rate base heretofore allowed 
by the Commission from approximately 5.26 per cent to ~.4 7 
per cent, which is below the level heretofore found by the 
Commission to be reasonable (R. 118-119, 30). And once 
the change proposed by the tariff were made, the Company 
thereafter would not have any improvement in or lessening 
of its earnings by reason of the recovery locally of moneys 
with which to pay municipal levies because subsequent 
billing would be automatically adjusted to provide for any 
increase or reduction in these municipal levies (R. 30). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMIS-
SION'S FINDINGS THAT THE INCLUSION OF 
MUNICIPAL LEVIES IN THE COMPANY'S 
STATE-WIDE RATES IS AN UNJUST AND 
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DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE AND THAT 
SUCH PRACTICE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED 
BY THE COMPANY'S COLLECTING, SO FAR 
AS PRACTICABLE, MONEYS TO PAY SUCH 
LEVIES FROM ITS CUSTOMERS IN THE MU-
NICIPALITIES WHERE SUCH LEVIES ARE 
IMPOSED. 
II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CITY'S CONTENTION THAT MONEYS TO 
DISCHARGE ITS MUNICIPAL LEVY SHOULD 
BE PAID BY THE STATE-WIDE CUSTOMERS 
OF THE COMPANY. 
III. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITH-
IN ITS JURISDICTION AND VALID. IT 
NEITHER IMP AIRS ANY FRANCHISE OBLI-
GATION OF THE COMPANY TO THE CITY 
NOR IN ANY MANNER RELEASES OR EX-
TINGUISHES ANY INDEBTEDNESS, LIABIL-
ITY OR OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY TO 
THE CITY. 
IV. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION FIXES 
RATES; IT IMPOSES NO TAX OF ANY KIND 
ON THE TELEPHONE CUSTOMER. 
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ARGUMENT 
We perceive but one issue in this case, namely 
whether just and nondiscriminatory practices require that 
the Company construct its rates so that, so far as practic-
able, money to discharge municipal levies shall be collected 
from its customers within the municipalities where such 
levies are imposed rather than from its customers on a 
state-wide basis. The Company will, however, undertake to 
deal with each of the Points relied upon by the plaintiff in 
its brief and will do so in the following argument under 
defendant's Points herein designated. 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMIS-
SION'S FINDINGS THAT THE INCLUSION OF 
MUNICIPAL LEVIES IN THE COMPANY'S 
STATE-WIDE RATES IS AN UNJUST AND 
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE AND THAT 
SUCH PRACTICE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED 
BY THE COMPANY'S COLLECTING, SO FAR 
AS PRACTICABLE, MONEYS TO PAY SUCH 
LEVIES FROM ITS CUSTOMERS IN THE MU-
NICIPALITIES WHERE SUCH LEVIES ARE 
IMPOSED. 
Under this point the Company will deal witp. the argu-
ments advanced by plaintiff under its Points numbered 1, 
2 and 3. 
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At the outset of its argument, the City, under its Point 
1, appears to urge that the order of the Commission here 
under review is unlawful in that the Commission, by some 
step taken in the hearing before it, unlawfully cast the 
burden of proof on the City. Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 105 Utah 230, 142 P. 2d 873, Rehearing denied 105 
Utah 266, 145 P. 2d 790, is cited as an authority in point. 
That was a discrimination case initiated by the Commis-
sion, involving two rate schedules, namely, the intrastate 
toll rates of the Mountain States Company and the inter-
state joint toll rates of the Mountain States Company and 
the American Company and other associated Bell compan-
ies At the hearing the Commission showed the differential 
in charges prevailing for like mileage under the two rates. 
The court held that such showing made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination and that the burden was then on the 
Mountain States Company to justify the differentials. We 
are unable to perceive how that decision bears upon the 
problem here under consideration. In the case at bar the 
Company must produce evidence upon which the Commis-
sion may find that the practice of recovery from its custo-
mers through state-wide rates of money with which to pay 
municipal levies is unjust and discriminatory. Actually, as 
the record will show, the Company assumed the burden and 
proved its case. If the City intends to complain of some 
informality in the procedure of the Commission, the answer 
to any such contention is found in Section 76-6-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, which provides that ' 
"All hearings, investigations and proceedings 
shall be governed by this chapter and by rules of 
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practice and procedure to be adopted by the public 
utilities commission; in the conduct thereof the tech~ 
nical rules of evidence need not be applied. No in-
formality in any hearing, investigation or proceed-
ings, or in the manner of taking testimony, shall in-
validate any order, decision rule or regulation made, 
approved or confirmed by the commission." 
- and in Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah et 
al., 67 Utah 222, 247 Pac. 284, where, at page 238 of the 
Utah Report, the Court said : 
"There is also some complaint that the order of 
the commission was irregular. If that were so, how-
ever, in view of the statute (section 4820, supra) it 
would not invalidate the order of the commission 
that is complained of here." 
The City next contends that there is no evidence to 
-::. support the findings of the Commission that unjust dis-
:. crimination exists in the practice of the Company of collect-
::::- ing money with which to pay municipal levies from its 
_ -·- customers on a state-wide basis. Defendants in nowise 
_':: concede this contention of the City for there is, we believe, 
in Exhibit 2 and in the testimony of the witness Sawyer 
= ~- ample evidence to support the Commission's findings. 
A determination of the question of the sufficiency of 
- ; the evidence to support the Commission's findings requires 
-_- -at the outset a brief consideration of the controlling stat-
~; utes and decisions of this Court. The controlling statute is, 
~ we believe, Section 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
:···which provides in part that 
"* * * * No new or additional evidence 
may be introduced in the supreme court, but the 
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cause shall be heard on the record of the commission 
as certified by it. The review shall not be extended 
further than to determine whether the commission 
has regularly pursued its authority, including a de-
termination of whether the order or decision under. 
review violates any right of the petitioner under 
the constitution of the United States or of the state 
of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the com-
mission on questions of fact shall be final and shall 
not be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall 
include ultimate facts and the findings and conclu-
sions of the commission on reasonableness and dis-
crimination. * * *" 
No good purpose could be' served by citing the many 
cases which have construed this statute, for, as observed 
by this court in Union Pacific R. Co. et al. v. Public Service 
Commission et al., 103 Utah 459, 135 P. 2d 915, at page 
462 of the Ut.ah Report, 
"The rule is so well established as to require no 
citation of authority that the reviewing power of 
the court is confined to the questions as to whether 
the commission regularly pursued its authority, 
whether its findings are justified by the evidence, 
and whether its orders contravene any right under 
the Constitution of the United States or the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah." 
There are, however, two cases from this Court dealing 
with the scope of review, which we believe are partic-
ularly helpful. These are the St. John ·Station Case, 
Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Utah, 80 Utah 455, 15 P. 2d 358, and the later case. 
of Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com-~ 
mission et al., 81 Utah 286, 17 P. 2d 287. r 
i 
1 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
In the St. John Case the court, at page 472 of the Utah 
Report said : 
"* * * What we are really asked to review, 
therefore, is the question of the judgment of the 
commission as applied to the evidence. But we can-
not like can the Supreme Court of New Mexico, sub-
stitute our judgment for the judgment of the com-
mission. We must determine whether any reason-
able mind could have come to the same judgment as 
the commission on the evidence controlled by the 
principles of law heretofore discussed. If there is 
any evidence upon which any reasonably judging 
mind could come to the same conclusion that the 
commission came to, then we must affirm the de-
cision. * * *" 
In the later case, at page 291 of the Utah Report, the 
court said: 
"In the St. John Station Case we considered at 
length the scope of the inquiry which this court could 
entertain in a case of certiorari from the commission 
under section 4834 (now Sec. 76-6-16, supra). We 
held that we had no authority to determine from our 
own judgment whether, under the evidence, the agen-
cy should be discontinued, and thus put ourselves in 
the place of the commission, but we must determine 
whether any reasonable mind could come to the same 
judgment as the commission came to on the.evidence 
controlled by the principles of law discussed in that 
opinion. If there is any evidence upon which ·any 
reasonable judging mind could come to the same 
conclusion that the commission came to, it would be 
our duty to affirm the decision of the commission. 
* * *" 
So in the case at bar, the review extends to a consider-
•"Ltion of the judgment of the commission as applied to the 
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evidence and the inquiry will be whether there is any evi-
dence upon which any reasonably judging mind could come 
to the same conclusion that the commission came to. What 
then, is the record before us? 
There is no essential dispute of facts. The facts were 
presented by the oral and documentary evidence of the 
witness Sawyer. Neither the City nor any party appearing 
in opposition introduced any evidence. 
The Company, in meeting the problem presented by 
these municipal levies, might have (a) done nothing, (b) 
collected locally from its customers only amounts necessary 
to pay those levies imposed since its last general rate case, 
or (c) collected locally from its customers, so far as practic-
able, all moneys necessary to pay municipal levies. It dis-
carded (a) because it believed that the time had come when 
circumstances necessitated a change in the practices prev-
iously employed. It discarded (b) because it considered that 
if it were correct in its basic premise of the discrimination 
in its present practice, simple justice required that the 
practice be completely removed and not removed only as to 
some customers and retained as to others (R. 176-77). The 
Company therefore determined to pursue course (c). 
The facts are that for many years municipal levies 
were so nominal that they could have made no appreciable 
difference in rate schedules one way or another. In recent 
years they have been rising sharply in certain cities and 
towns. They now constitute a substantial item of company 
expense. They are fixed by a percentage levy of the gross : 
receipts of the exchange revenue of the Company in the l' 
i 
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particular city or town. The Company has no real control 
over the rate of levy or where these levies may next be 
imposed. At the time of hearing before the Comission, 
forty-six cities and towns imposed these levies, which, when 
. related to local exchange revenue, ranged from .39 per cent 
to 7.28 per cent. Thirty other cities, towns and villages im-
- posed municipal levies, but these were so low that when 
related to the lowest priced telephone service within the 
exchange would not produce a charge of one cent per 
::: month; and in ninety-four cities, towns and communities, 
-:..:no municipal levies were imposed. 
In the past these municipal levies were reflected in the 
bills of every exchange customer in the State entirely with-
.. out regard to whether or not the city or town in which that 
:.:customer resided imposed any municipal levy. Thus the 
~-customer in City A, which imposed no municipal levy, paid 
the Company money to discharge in part the municipal levy 
.:.-:of City B. 
~ On this evidence the Commission reached the conclu-
· __ sion that the practice of the Company of collecting from all 
~-~-~its exchange customers in this State money with which to 
~- pay these municipal levies imposed by only certain cities 
... 
- 1nd towns, and with wide disparity of rate as between cer-
:> ;ain cities and towns, was an unjust and discriminatory 
; ~ :lractice. 
~~.~ 
. { Would a reasonably judging mind have necessarily 
#;·eached a contrary decision? We think not. 
~·,) 
,JC;' Testing the matter by another approach, suppose but 
!~kne city in the State imposed a municipal levy and that this 
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levy was five per cent of the Company's gross exchange 
revenue within the city and no other city or town in the 
State imposed any municipal levy and that the rates of the 
Company were such that every exchange customer in the 
State contributed money for the payment of this levy and 
the Commission found that this practice was unjust and 
discriminatory, could any reasonably judging mind say that 
the Commission must have reached a contrary conclusion? 
As we perceive the argument of the City in relation to 
this question, it tacitly admits that there is at least prima 
facie discrimination in the practice of the Company in re-
covering from its customers on a state-wide basis money 
with which to pay municipal levies. But the City in effect 
asserts that the discrimination cannot be abolished for the 
reasons which it assigns. 
It is first suggested that the Commission having prev~ 
iously approved state-wide rate schedules which included 
money for the payment of municipal levies, the approval is 
res judicata and cannot in this proceeding be disturbed. It 
would seem manifest to us that if the Commission now finds 
that a practice previously allowed is demonstrated to be. 
unjust and discriminatory, it is not only the power but the 
duty of the Commission to correct the abuse as quickly as 
possible. 
See: 
Skinner & Eddy Corporation v. United States 
et al., 249 U. S. 557. 
Then the City in effect seeks to avoid the discrimina· 
tion under consideration by developing the proposition that 
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, there are elements of discrimination in the state-wide rate 
schedules. The Company makes no contention that its basic 
rate schedules are free from all discrimination. Basic tele-
phone rates are now and for many years in the past have 
been arranged on what is known as the state-wide theory 
- of rate making. This system has been adopted by. the reg-
ulatory commissions in almost all States for promulgating 
rates for telephone service. It has two basic concepts: First, 
that the rate for service shall be graduated according to 
the value of the service to the user ; and, second, that the 
rates for telephone exchange service shall be graduated 
according to the number of telephones in use in each ex-
- change, with the same rates applying in every exchange of 
approximately the same size. For example, all exchanges 
__:: 
having four hundred to eight hundred telephones would 
have the same rates for the different classes of service. To 
the extent that one exchange in this classification might 
-· have just over four hundred telephones and another might 
- have just under eight hundred telephones, it is, of course, 
obvious that there is some reasonable discrimination under 
::.-- this theory of rate making. Likewise it is reasonable to 
.- expect that although the rate for telephone service is not 
: :-;: primarily based on the cost of service, nevertheless it may 
very well cost the Telephone Company more to furnish 
service to a user living five miles from the central office 
than it would to one living five blocks from such office 
_ ~( inasmuch as a pair of wires is nececssary to serve each 
'· · single line and must run the entire distance from the central 
office to the user's premises. 
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The state-wide method of making telephone rates and 
occasionally rates of other utilities has been approved by 
all of the courts of last resort reviewing the question. Typi-
cal of these decisions are: 
City of New York v. Feinberg et al., 109 N.Y. S. 
2d 131, decided January 9, 1952; 
People ex rel. P. U. C. v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co., et al., 243 P. 2d 397, decided 
February 6, 1952; 
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Memphis 
et al., 200 Fed. 657, at 660; 
P. S. Gas Co. v. Board of PUC, 87 A. 651, at 654; 
St. Louis and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 
at 665; 
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Odell, 45 Fed. 2d 180 
at 181, and cases cited therein; 
Board of Supervisors of Arlington County v. 
Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. C. & P. Co. of 
Va., 45 S. E. 2d 145. 
However, the City does not attack the state-wide theory 
of rate making but contends that it objects to the depar-
ture therefrom with respect to franchise fees and taxes, 
especially in the absence of any evidence to show any rea-
sonable basis in fact for that departure from established 
and approved practice. 
The position of the Company in answer to the con-
tentions of the City is this: There are concededly elements 
of reasonable discrimination in state-wide rate making. It i 
is neither possible nor practical to remove all of these ele-
ments of discriminatio~. We have here under consideration 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
a particular item of Company expense, namely, municipal 
levies. The inclusion of money to pay these municipal levies 
in state-wide rates is an unjust and discriminatory practice. 
This is one practice which can be isolated, effectively dealt 
with, and abolished by the proposal under consideration. 
Manifestly, then, the injustice and discrimination which 
can readily be reached should be removed at once and to 
that extent the state-wide rate making practice bettered 
and improved. 
In its Point numbered 3 the City contends in effect that 
the benefits of its franchise with the Company flow out to 
-- the users of telephone service throughout the State and 
that accordingly the Telephone customers state-wide should 
provide the money with which to pay the municipal levy 
of the City. 
Consideration of this argument requires further ex-
-- amination of the taxing provisions of Ogden's franchise. 
The measure was patently a revenue raising imposition. 
It was expressly levied in lieu of all license, franchise, oc-
cupation and other similar taxes. 
It was not pretended to be commensurate with any 
benefit or protection which the Company might receive be-
cause it provided that 
"The Company shall pay to the City of Ogden 
upon the passage, approval and acceptance of this 
ordinance, an amount equal to one per cent (1%) 
of the local exchange revenues derived from tele-
phones located within Ogden City limits." 
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The amount of free service which the Company was 
required to render was also graduated according to the pop-
ulation of the City. 
The money which is derived from this revenue raising 
measure goes into the general funds of the City and is ex-
pended by the City for such municipal purposes as it sees 
fit. 
The franchise features of these impositions are ac-
tually incidental and insignificant. This is illustrated by 
the fact that for some twenty-two years the Company had 
no franchise whatever in Salt Lake City but was taxed and 
continued to pay Salt Lake City an imposition measured 
by a percentage of its gross exchange revenue within the 
City (R. 181). 
Apart from the nature of the imposition involved is 
the contention of the City sound on principal? We think 
not. To illustrate, a telephone customer in Ogden calls 
Tooele. The facilities of the Company in Tooele are as val-
uable to the Ogden customer as those in Ogden are to the 
Tooele customer, yet Tooele imposes only a nominal tax 
upon the Company, while the municipal levy of Ogden is 
1.44 per cent. Thus while the benefits from the existence of 
the Company's plant in Ogden flow out to other cities, so 
also do the benefits from plants in other cities flow into 
Ogden. One benefit serves to offset the other. 
Viewing the foregoing aspects of the practice here un-
der consideration and turning back again to the test which 
1 
must guide us in this case, could any reasonable mind come 
to the same judgment that the Commission came to in this . 
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case? We believe that the conclusion of the Commission is 
not only that of a reasonably judging mind but the only 
conclusion which could properly be reached on the record 
_presented. 
For the reason that every case of this kind must be 
determined from an examination of the record presented, 
decisions from other jurisdictions may be of little assist-
ance, and the foregoing discussion should conclude the argu-
ment under defendant's Point I. We shall, however, con-
sider certain decisions from other jurisdictions. 
City of Elmhurst v. Western United Gas & Elec-
tric Co. et al., 1 N. E. 2d 489 (Ill. 1936). 
The gas company here served an area called its nor-
thern territory. The Illinois Commerce Commission made 
an order approving a rate schedule in this northern terri-
tory of the company and, as a part thereof, authorized the 
company to add to its uniform charges for gas service a 
percentage differential sufficient to meet the annual pay-
ments collected by five cities, including Elmhurst, by virtue 
of respective franchise ordinances. Similar taxes were not 
exacted in other cities in the northern territory except the 
five cities in question. The Elmhurst franchise ordinance 
required a three per cent levy on gross receipts on business 
done within its boundaries. Elmhurst complained to the 
Commission about the three per cent additional allowance 
on the rates. The Commission dismissed this complaint, and 
the Jower court sustained. 
The opinion reviews several Illinois statutes, most of 
which are generally the same as those of Utah, concerning 
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unreasonable rates and prohibiting discrimination. One sec-
tion prohibited utilities from establishing rate differentials 
as between localities and between classes of service and 
customers. Whether precisely covered by similar Utah stat-
utes or not, the Commission has always considered tele-
phone rates on the same basis as required in Illinois. No 
question was raised as to the basic rates, so the controversy 
settled around the three per cent addition to cover the cost 
of the franchise payment based on gross receipts. The court 
at page 491 of the Northeastern Report says: 
"It is argued that annual franchise payments 
should not be charged against the patrons of the 
appellant, and that the practical effect is to give 
those who are nonusers of gas the benefit of the 
franchise rate paid by gas users. Such is the effect. 
It is seldom that the imposition of a tax or franchise 
charge does not work a hardship on some individuals. 
The human race has not yet reached that degree of 
perfection whereby taxing systems have been evolved 
which in their practical operation do not, on occasion, 
work some degree of injustice to some individuals." 
Elmhurst contended that the franchise payment was a 
capital charge. The court dismissed this contention at page 
491 of the Northeastern Report, saying: 
"Franchise payments are properly chargeable. 
as an element of the cost of operation which should 
be borne by the consumers of the utility's product or 
service (Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton (D. C.) 267 
F. 231; Chicago Railways Co. v. Illinois Commerce 
Comm. (D. C.) 277 F. 970; and the amortization of 
the franchise expenses should be charged as an op-
erating expense. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. Smith 
(D. C. 295 F. 385, 391). It would be unjust to spread 
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the burden of this annual franchise payment over 
the whole northern division. It should be borne by 
the company's consumers residing within the city 
as that city alone receives the advantage of such 
annual payment. So, also, it is immaterial in what 
form the pro rata share of the consumers' payment of 
the annual payment be made to the city. There is 
no statute in this state prescribing the method of 
allocating such item and it may properly be written 
on the consumer's statement as three per cent." 
In conclusion, at page 492 of the Northeastern Report, the 
court said: 
"The order of the Commerce Commission does 
not, as applied to the customers of the public utility 
within the appellant city, create an unreasonable dif-
ference between localities and classes of service." 
It will be readily apparent that the facts in the Elm-
hurst case are closely identical to those in the case at bar, 
the only difference being a gas service rather than a tele-
phone service was involved. It is apparent the gas com-
. - pany rates were arranged on somewhat the same basis as 
the telephone rates in Utah, and certainly the direct ques-
-::: tion of discrimination in favor of the users within the city 
limits of the city exacting a franchise, as compared to the 
users elsewhere in the state, was directly raised. The de-
cision appears to be so closely in point as to be sound author-
- ity for the Court to consider in disposing of the issues in 
the instant matter. 
State v. Department of Public Service, 142 P. 
2d 498 (Wash. 1943). 
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This case came to the Washington Supreme Court on 
an appeal of numerous issues involved in a general rate 
case. The Washington Commission (designated as "the 
Department" in the opinion) entered an order that all oc-
cupational and franchise and similar municipal charges 
might be passed on to the rate payer. Upon the record, 
commencing at page 532 of the Pacific Report, the court 
undertook to determine whether or not the Washington 
Commission, under the law of that State, had authority to 
issue this order. The municipal exactions in question con-
sisted of occupation taxes and franchise taxes. The court 
considered these taxes separately. 
The occupation tax levies ranged from four per cent 
in Seattle to one per cent in Olympia, Shelton and Dayton. 
The cities contended that any discrimination against per-
sons living outside the cities in question was so slight as to 
be negligible. The court in answering this contention at 
page 535 of the Pacific Report said : 
"As above stated, the bases upon which excise 
taxes have been levied by the cities vary greatly, 
ranging from four per cent of the gross income to 
one per cent. No one can say how far this variation 
might be extended. It suggests large possibilities of 
municipal action. Manifestly there is an element of 
unjust discrimination in allowing one community to 
levy and collect from respondent or any public util-
ity engaged in business throughout the state an oc-
cupation tax which in turn the utility would collect 
by a, state-wide increase in rates. If such taxes were 1 
generally levied and varied little in the percentage of 
gross revenue by which the tax is computed, the mat· 
ter might well be unimportant; but the contrary is 
the fact." 
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The cities further contended that the order in question 
was in violation of constitutional and statutory powers en-
joyed by the cities. In answer to this contention, the court, 
at the same page, said : 
"By Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 10391, the department 
is vested with authority over rates to be charged by 
public utilities. In the case of State ex rei. City of 
Seattle v. Public Service' Commission, 103 Wash. 72, 
173 P. 737, 739, this court held that the department 
(then the commission) had the power 'to fix reason-
able or sufficient rates at the request of the carrier 
notwithstanding the franchise contract.' An order 
of the commission approving a tariff filed by the 
utility in disregard of a franchise provision provid-
ing for commutation tickets was upheld. It would 
seem that the case cited is in some conflict with at 
least one decision of this court, but it is not neces-
sary to consider that matter here. In any event, the 
department enjoys wide powers in exercising its 
authority to fix rates." 
The Washington court then undertakes to deal with 
- · the matter of franchise taxes and reaches the conclusion 
~: that the Department had no power to pass these impositions 
~:~ along to local rate payers unless the Department found that 
.: such taxes were excessive or out of proportion to the privi-
:~;: lege accorded to the utility. If the Department so found 
~-:::- then it would have the power to fix the proper proportion 
111( between general operating expense and the local rate pay-
j~ 
,fl'; ers. We do not intend in the least to disparage the Supreme 
~-~Court of Washington, but we are unable to follow the logic 
rf~ of this proposition. Either the Department did or did not 
f!P:/ have jurisdiction to deal with the problem. If it did not 
~~~-
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have jurisdiction, then we would think it clear that it could 
not break down a franchise tax payment and undertake to 
determine how much of the same represented compensation 
for a privilege accorded to a utility by the municipality and 
how much was in excess of such compensation. If, how-
ever, the department did have jurisdiction, we would think 
it clearly had power to deal with the entire problem. We 
believe that the Washington court loses sight of the funda-
mental fact that the Department was not dealing with the 
relationship between the company on the one hand and the 
cities on the other, but rather with the relationship of the 
company to its rate payers, which relationship involved 
only the matter of rates, a subject entirely and peculiarly 
within the jurisdiction of the Department. This funda-
mental fact was clearly recognized by the Illinois court in 
its decision in the Elmhurst case, supra and has been recog-
nized by the Courts of this State as will be demonstrated 
in the consideration of defendant's Point III. 
In State v. Department of Public Utilities, 207 P. 2d 
712 (Wash. 1949) the Supreme Court of that State again 
deals with the subject of the treatment of these municipal 
levies and appears to hold that the Washington Commis-
sion had the power to pass on to rate payers a tax for the 
privilege of using the streets. The decision does not disclose 
what difference there may be between a tax imposed for 
the use of streets and a franchise imposition exacted for 
the same purpose. On principle we can perceive no differ-
ence. 
Even if the Washington cases, attempting as they do 
to draw a fine line of distinction between franchise taxes 
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and other municipal levies, are correct on principle, we 
believe that they are of no controlling importance here be-
cause the imposition of City by its express terms is 
"in lieu of all license, franchise, occupation and other 
similar taxes." 
Here is an unequivocal expression that the tax in question 
was intended to embrace all the other specified impositions. 
In the following decisions by state public utilities com-
missions, the same general question as presented in the 
case at bar was considered, namely, whether the recovery 
of municipal levies oi all forms considered here, including 
franchise payments, represents a discrimination in the util-
ity's rate structure. In other words, the commissions were 
concerned with whether an unjust and discriminatory prac-
tice resulted from the collection from rate payers in the 
entire territory served of money necessary to discharge 
these municipal levies. The decisions all indicate, after 
finding such a method of recovery would be discrimi11-atory, 
that the discriminatory practice could be cured if municipal 
levies were recovered within the boundaries of the cities 
enacting the various forms of municipal levies. 
See: 
Detroit Edison Company, 16 PUR NS 9, at 24 
(Mich. 1936) ; ( 
Re Consumers Power Co., 14 PUR NS 36, at 41 
(Mich. 1936) ; 
Re Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 7 PUR NS 21, at 
33 (N. C. 1934) ; 
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Re Idaho Power Company, PUR 1921C 238, at 
242; 
Swarthmore v. Philadelphia M. & S. S. R. Co., 
PUR 1921E 252, at 261 (Penn.) ; 
Re Southern California Gas Co., PUR 1922A 
277. 
There is every reason to classify the franchise tax pay-
ment in the same category as other municipal licens~ and 
occupation taxes of any nature whatsoever, at least to the 
extent that the cost of the franchise payment from the 
Company to the City is based upon the gross receipts re-
ceived from exchange service within the city limits. The 
other forms of municipal levy are likewise based upon the 
same measure of tax. Conceivably, there might be some 
ground for drawing a distinction if a company contracted 
with a city for a franchise covering a period of years and 
made one single payment at the time of entering into the 
1 
franchise to cover the entire franchise period. Under such 
circumstances the company on the one hand would be mak-
1 
ing one single payment, the amount of which would be sub-
1 ject to negotiation between the parties and would be pay-
able at the time the contract was entered into. Variatiot;IS, 
in the gross receipts of the company from the customers 1 
residing within the city limits of the municipality would 
make no difference as to the entire cost over the life of 
the contract. There might be and probably would be justifi- : 
cation for capitalizing the single payment as a capital : 
charge rather than an operating expense. On the other 
hand, all these courts agree that the cost of these municipal '!. 
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levies when based on gross receipts, whether for a franchise 
payment or any other form of tax, is an operating expense. 
If a differentiation is to be made between franchise 
taxes and other forms of municipal exaction, so that money 
to discharge franchise tax payments are collected from the 
general rate payers over the State and the money with 
which to pay other forms of levy from the customers resid-
. ing within the city limits of municipalities adopting other 
: forms of tax, then obviously it would be to the advantage 
. of a city considering such a tax to put it in the form of a 
. franchise payment, thereby requiring the general body of 
.. customers over the State to share in the cost of the tax. 
If this Court is disposed to follow the Washington de-
~ cisions exclusively and rule that the Commission is author-
. :ized to approve a tariff permitting the municipal exactions 
:·to be included in the rates of the customers within the city 
- limits of those cities enacting such levies only if they are 
·-not franchise taxes, then, in the opinion of the defendant 
-~Company, the Court, as a matter of law, or the Commission 
- .3.s a matter of administrative regulation may as well dis-
-~lpprove the tariff in its entirety. The very object of the 
~ · :ariff is to avoid what the Company considers and the Com-
·>nission found to be an unjust and discriminatory practice. 
>-:ro draw a fine distinction between franchise payments and 
:-:::~ther forms of municipal levies, all of which are based on 
~_~ross receipts, would leave just as serious a situation with 
~; espect to discriminatory practice as now exists. 
! fJ~j State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Service Com-
:-ft:,ission, 245 S. W. 2d 851 (Mo. 1952), is a case involving 
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a private water company serving sixty-six incorporate( 
and numerous unincorporated areas in St. Louis County 
Five separate rates were provided for different classes oJ 
customers, but the same rate for each class applied in thE 
entire territory, regardless of the size of the city or othe1 
considerations. Previously the company's property had been 
valued and its rates fixed on a system-wide basis. Sixteen 
of the sixty-six incorporated areas levied special taxes on 
the gross receipts of the company within the area of the sep-
arate municipalities. Levies ranged from two to five per 
cent of the gross receipts. There, as in the case at bar, the 
company contended that the practice of recovering money 
with which to pay these levies from its customers on a sys-
tem-wide basis was discriminatory, and the company pro-
posed to the commission to correct these inequities between 
the customers. Tariffs were filed by the company to cover 
the change in rates in order to take care of these munici-
pal levies, but otherwise to make no change in the basic 
rate schedule. 
One basic difference in the facts, however, develops 
from the disclosure that the water company proposed to 
pass on franchise taxes only where they exceeded two per 
cent; that is, if the city collected a five per cent franchise 
tax, only three per cent would be included in the rate for 
water service to the customer. The reason for eliminating 
the first two per cent from consideration is not apparent. 
Upon hearing, the commission found the practice in 
question to be discriminatory in that the consumers in one 
area were burdened with a part of the taxes levied or pay-
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ments exacted in another area and that the consumers in 
municipalities seeking to obtain revenue from such taxes 
should bear the burden of providing the revenue with which 
to pay the tax. The commission's order made no differen-
tiation between the form of tax and considered franchise 
taxes along with license taxes, occupation taxes, street 
rentals and kindred levies in other forms. The commission 
further found the cost should be included in the rate for 
water service by adding to each individual customer's bill 
a separate item. This latter finding is in accord with the 
Commission's finding in the case at bar. 
Upon review the intermediate court sustained the com-
mission's order. The Supreme Court reviewed to determine 
·whether the commission's order was reasonable and lawful 
or, conversely, arbitrary and without reasonable basis, con-
cluding that upon the record there was no reasonable basis 
for the commission's order. The judgment of the circuit 
:court was reversed. 
In the Missouri case no showing was made or evidence 
:presented to show what change would be made in the com-
: pany's rate of .return if money to pay these taxes were re-
:.covered locally, and the Missouri court appears to have 
:·taken the position that in the absence of any showing of 
;the extent of benefit to the company from the proposed 
._change in rate practice it should not approve the tariff. In 
:the case at bar, however, the Company showed affirmatively 
_the earnings benefit which it would receive ( .21 per cent or 
i from 5.26 per cent to 5.4 7 per cent) and that the rate of 
~return with this improvement in earnings would be less 
fthan that previously authorized by the Commission. 
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The Missouri court also takes the position that inas-
much as the largest part of the gross revenues received for 
water service rendered came from the largest municipali-
ties, and inasmuch as, for the most part, the largest munici-
palities were the ones enacting the tax levies, the discrim-
ination resulting from these municipal levies would tend 
to be cured. The opinion suggests, although there was no 
evidence on the subject, that it undoubtedly cost less to 
furnish the water service in the larger municipalities, and 
therefore the profit should be greater in such cities be-
cause the water company charged the same rate for metered 
and unmetered water service, regardless of the size of the 
town and regardless of the distance from the reservoirs or 
the length of the distribution lines. Telephone rates, on 
the other hand, vary as between classes of service, that is, 
there is more than one rate for business service and there 
are several classes of residence service in each exchange. 
Furthermore, the lowest rates for each of the classes of 
service apply in the smallest towns and they are graduated 
upward by groups, depending _on the number of ·customers 
in the exchange. These practices contribut~ substantially 
toward the elimination of any discrimination between users 
in large and small communities. 
There is, moreover, a basic difference between tele-
phone rates and water rates. The latter rates are measured 
by a unit of consumption, such as a gallon. Telephone rates 
are based on value. This value depends upon how many 
telephones each customer is able to reach, both within the 
area of the exchange and elsewhere. It is for this reason 
that telephone rates not only vary as between classes of 
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service in each exchange, but also vary as between ex-
changes, depending upon the number of customers in the 
exchange. A water user, however, is concerned only with 
the water drawn through his connection or meter. Apart 
from the possibility of pressure, he is not concerned with 
how many or how few other water customers are served 
or where they may be located. 
~ 
The Missouri court assumes, upon the grounds above 
suggested, that, apart from the question of municipal levies, 
there was discrimination in the flat system-wide rates of 
the water company, and holds that until such other discrim-
ination was isolated and determined the discrimination aris-' 
ing from the municipal levies should not be removed. It 
is noted that the Missouri court thus proceeds at the outset 
upon a pure assumption not supported by any evidence. In 
the case of the telephone rates, however, this same assump-
tion may not fairly be made. Moreover,. as the witness 
Sawyer pointed out, the figures to develop the cost of tele-
phone service between various communities were not and 
never have been available (R. 134-35) . If the courts are 
to insist that the matter of possible discrimination as be-
tween u~ers in different communities be refined down to 
absolute costs, then it would be extremely difficult for the 
Company to do so. This same difficulty . might not be ex-
' perienced with a water company, because its rates being 
;- based upon a unit of consumption, costs might be reduced 
- to that unit. It is difficult for us to believe that the una vail-
~ ability of such cost figures of the Company should afford 
. a reasonable excuse for not now eliminating such an ob-
" vious discrimination as is produced by failure to recover 
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locally money to discharge the municipal levies here in-
volved. 
We in no manner concede that there is anything un-
reasonable in the conclusion reached by the Commission in 
the case at bar, admitting however for the purposes of 
argument that different courts or different commissions 
might reasonably reach different results in weighing and 
considering the evidence presented in such a case, then in 
this very difference of result so reached is found a funda-
mental reason why the Missouri case is not decisive or 
controlling here. The reason lies in the differences in scope 
of review permitted under the Missouri and Utah statutes. 
Under the Missouri statutes, decisions of its public ser-
vice commission are first subject to review by the circuit 
courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The controlling statute on review by the circuit court 
appears to be Section 386.510, Missouri Revised Statutes, 
1949, which provides that 
"Within thirty days after the application for a 
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted, 
then within thirty days after the rendition of the 
decision on rehearing, the applicant may apply to 
the circuit court of the county where the hearing 
was held or in which the commission has its princi-
pal office for a writ of certiorari or review (herein 
referred to as a writ of review) for the purpose of 
having the reasonableness or lawfulness of the orig-
inal order or decision or the order or decision on 
rehearing inquired into or determined. * * * No 
new or additional evidence may be introduced upon 
the hearing in the circuit court but the cause shall 
be heard by the court without the intervention of a 
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jury on the evidence and exihibits introduced before 
the commission and certified to by it. The commis-
sion and each party to the action or proceeding be-
fore the commission shall have the right to appear 
in the review proceedings. Upon such hearing the 
circuit court shall enter judgment either affirming 
or setting aside the order of the commission under 
review. In case said order is reversed by reason of 
the commission's failing to receive testimony prop-
erly proffered, the court shall remand the cause to 
the commission, with instructions to receive the tes-
timony so proffered and rejected, and enter a new 
order based upon the evidence theretofore taken, and 
such as it is directed to receive. The court may, in 
its discretion, remand any case which is reversed by 
it to the commission for further action. No court in 
this state, except the circuit courts to the extent 
herein specified and the Supreme Court or the var-
ious courts of appeals on appeal, shall have jurisdic-
tion to review, correct or annul any order or decision 
of the commission or to suspend or delay the exe-
cuting or operation thereof, or, to enjoin, restrain 
or interfere with the commission in the performance 
of official duties. The circuit courts of this state 
shall always be deemed open for the trial of suits 
brought to review the orders and decisions of the 
commission as provided in the public service com-
mission law and the same shall be tried and deter-
mined as suits in equity." 
The jurisdiction of the Missouri Supreme Court is 
derivative, and on an appeal to that Court the question is 
whether the order or decision is reasonable and lawful or, 
t 
~:·conversely, whether it is arbitrary and without reasonable 
: basis. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
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A careful reading of the Missouri decisions discloses 
that the Supreme Court exercises the power to weigh the 
evidence. 
See: 
State v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 
47 s. w. 2d 102; 
State v. Public Service Commission, 252 S. W. 
446. 
Thus the power of the Missouri court is much like that 
of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, considered by this 
Court in Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of Utah, supra, where it was shown that the 
New Mexico statute provided for a review by the Supreme 
Court of the reasonableness and lawfulness of an order 
made by the State Corporation Commission upon the evi-
dence adduced before the Commission and that the Supreme 
Court upon the evidence determined the reasonableness and 
lawfulness of the order made by the Commission: Thus 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, like that 
of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, operates directly on 
the evidence and not on the decision of the commission. 
This the Utah courts may not do under the provisions of 
said Section 76-6-16, supra, as was clearly pointed out by 
the Court in Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co. v. Public' Utilr 
ities Commission of Utah, supra (St. John case). 
The inquiry in this State must be not whether the de-
cision of the Commission is reasonable and lawful, but 
whether any reasonably judging mind could have reached 
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the same decision as the Commission reached. Tested in the 
light of that inquiry the order and decision of the Commis-
sion should be sustained. 
II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CITY'S CONTENTION THAT MONEYS TO 
DISCHARGE ITS MUNICIPAL LEVY SHOULD 
BE PAID BY THE STATE-WIDE CUSTOMERS 
OF THE COMPANY. 
The Company under this Point will deal with the City's 
argument under its Point 4. However, inasmuch as ques-
tions of law will be considered under subsequent Points, 
we will deal here only with the evidence. 
The City contends that the evidence shows that the 
Company must derive . the revenue with which to pay the 
exactions imposed by the municipal levy of 1941 from its 
rate payers on a state-wide basis. 
The evidence on this subject is oral and documentary. 
It consists of the testimony of the witness Sawyer and the 
franchise ordinance and the free service agreement (R. 
21-22-Exhibits 3 and 4). 
Considering first the exhibits : An examination of the 
franchise ordinance shows that it is in part, as the testi-
mony of the witness Sawyer indicated (R. 182), a working 
agreement between the Company and the City. Thus the 
City, in Section 1, grants to the Company certain privileges 
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with respect to the poles and wires of the Company, and 
the Company, in Section 3, grants certain privileges to the 
City with respect to its wires. In Section 4, however, we 
find the taxing provisions whereby the City, in lieu of all 
.license, franchise, occupation and other similar taxes, im-
poses the levy upon the Company. 
We have carefully searched this instrument for 
any language to indicate any expression of intent with re-
spect to the source of the Company's revenue with which to 
pay the tax. None has been found. 
There is nothing in the free service agreement which 
in any way suggests how the cost of providing that service 
would be recovered by the Company. 
Turning to the testimony of Sawyer, Mr. Thatcher, in 
cross-examination, suggests to the witness that the real par-
ties in interest in the franchise negotiations of 1941 were 
the inhabitants of Ogden; and Mr. Sawyer replies, "I would 
say that is correct." No further evidence on this subject 
appears in the record. 
Putting to one side at this time the consideration of 
any questions of law, the simple fact is that we have here 
purely a relationship between the City and the Company 
under which a tax was imposed upon the Company and it 
agreed to provide certain free service. There is not one 
scintilla of evidence that the parties ever agreed upon or 
even considered how the Company would raise the money 
to discharge these levies. 
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III. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITH-
IN ITS JURISDICTION AND VALID. IT 
NEITHER IMPAIRS ANY FRANCHISE OBLI-
GATION OF THE COMBANY TO THE CITY 
NOR IN ANY MANNER RELEASES OR EX-
TINGUISHES ANY INDEBTEDNESS, LIABIL-
ITY OR OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY TO 
THE CITY. 
Defendant will here deal with the City's Points 5, 6 
and 7, in which it is contended that the order under review 
impairs the City's contract and releases and extinguishes 
the obligation of the Company to the City and is beyond 
the power of the Commission and void. 
A simple way to test the validity of this argument is, 
we believe, to consider the relationship of the City and the 
Company before and after the order. 
As observed at the outset of this brief, this case touches 
two relationships, one between the Company and the City, 
the other between the Company and its rate payers. The 
f latter relationship is affected by the order; the former is 
not. Before the order in question, the Company was obli-
:1 gated to pay the City certain taxes and to render certain 
services. This duty remains completely unimpaired, for the 
' City will receive precisely the same money and service, at 
i! the same time, at the same rate, and from the same taxpayer 
as before. 
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The City contends that the real parties in interest in 
the franchise negotiation of 1941 were the inhabitants of 
the City. Conceding this to be so, the inhabitants of the 
City are not the- same body of persons as the Company's 
rate payers. The City may, in certain matters, act for its 
.. inhabitants, but the Commission controls the relationship 
between the Company and its customers, particularly with 
respect to rates and charges. That relationship alone has 
been changed for, by the order of the Commission, a rate 
practice previously employed will be removed and another 
rate practice prescribed. 
The Commission is here dealing with the matter of 
rates and charges. The general jurisdiction of the Com-
mission over this subject is found in Section 76-4-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, and express jurisdiction is found in >~. 
Section 76-4-4, of the same code. ~ 
The City, however, invokes the obligations of contract 
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. and the 
provisions of Article I, Section 18, Article VI, Sections 27 
and 29, and Article VII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution 1 
as imposing a restraint upon the power of the Commission. 
The position of ·the City in its most favorable light may 
be stated thus: In 1941 a franchise was granted by the 
City to the Company pursuant to which the Company agreed 
to pay certain moneys to the City. In granting this fran-
chise the City represented its inhabitants and the money 
which the Company was obligated to pay to the City was 
for the benefit of such inhabitants. The levy of 1941 would, 
however, be collected state-wide by the Company. Now the 
~ 
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Company proposes to collect the levy money from a body 
of Ogden inhabitants alone, thereby, as the City contends, 
increasing the rates which this body of inhabitants must 
pay and rendering the franchise levy of 1941 less valuable 
and beneficial to the inhabitants of the City. 
Substantially the same contentions as here made by the 
City have in a series of cases before this Court been made 
by municipalities and other parties and in each case denied. 
We believe it unnecessary to consider these cases in detail. 
In Salt Lake City et al. v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 
52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556, which was one of the earliest 
and most carefully considered cases on this subject, the 
Court in dealing with the contract provisions of the State 
and Federal Constitutions and the proyisions of Article 
XII, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution and holding the 
same not to be violated by the order of the Commission, at 
pages 217 and 218 of the Utah Report pointed out that 
"* * * This objection has often been made 
in cases where either the city or the street car com-
pany has sought relief from a rate fixed by franchise 
ordinances like those in question here. It should be 
observed, however, that where the controversy has 
arisen between the contracting parties merely, and 
in ordinary actions or proceedings, the courts have 
usually compelled compliance with the provisions of 
the franchise ordinances treating them as contracts. 
Where, however, as here, the application was made 
to Utilities Commissions in pursuance of a legisla-
tive act, the courts have, with few exceptions, held 
that a constitutional or statutory provision prohibit~ 
ing the Legislature from passing laws authorizing 
the construction and operation of street railways in 
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cities without the consent of the local authorities 
does not authorize such authorities to fix rates which 
may not be changed by the Legislature or by a utili-
ties commission created for that purpose. In other 
words, it is universally held that the regulation and 
fixing of rates is a governmental function, that is, a 
legislative function, which will not be deemed to have 
been surrendered by the sovereign state unless it 
has been done in clear and unequivocal terms." 
In City of St. George v. Public Utilities Commission 
et al., 62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720, the provisions of Article 
VI, Sections 27 and 29, were relied upon. In meeting this 
contention the Court at page 464 of the Utah Report says: 
"We can see nothing in either of these sections 
which prevents the state from enforcing its govern-
mental functions to regulate rates for public utility 
service. Section 27 clearly refers to obligations which 
arise out of contracts other than those pertaining 
to public utility service. It has so often been held 
that it would be useless to cite the numerous author-
ities that, unless the sovereign has in express terms 
or by unavoidable implication surrendered its gov- ~ 
ernmental function to regulate rates for public utility 
service, such surrender will be held not to exist." . 
In Murray City v. Utah Light & Traction Co. et al., 56 
Utah 437, 191 Pac. 421, the Court, at page 439 of the Utah 
Report said : 
"* * * It is not questioned that the city 
authorities have and had the right to grant to the 
defendants or their predecessors the privilege to 
operate a street railway upon the streets of such 
city. Neither is it questioned that the right exists 
to prescribe conditions or limitations under which 
~ 
~ 
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such privilege may be exercised. The power, how-
ever, to fix the fare to be received by the utility, or 
the defendants in this action is retained by the state 
and can be exercised by it whenever the necessity 
requires action upon its part." 
Again, in United States Smelting, Refining & M. Co. 
v. Utah Pozcer & Light Co. et al., 58 Utah 168, 197 Pac. 902, 
the contract provisions of the State and Federal Constitu-
tions were invoked. The Court, in answering these conten-
tions, at page 182 said: 
"It has been held repeatedly, both by the Su-
preme Court of the United States and the courts of 
last resort of many of the states, including this court, 
that the regulation of rates for public utilities is a 
governmental function coming directly within the 
police power of the state, and that for that reason 
the establishing or modifying of rates, although con-
tractual, does not violate the constitutional provision 
aforesaid." 
Each of the foregoing Utah cases involves a direct in-
terference with a rate fixed by contract or franchise, while 
in the case at bar, even conceding for argument the City's 
contention, the Commission's order has only an indirect 
and remote effect upon the franchise granted to the Com-
pany by the City. 
Furthermore, the constitutional prohibition against the 
impairment of the obligations of contract does not prohibit 
a State's reducing the obligation some contracting party 
owes to it but rather prohibits a State's impairing the obli-
gation which it owes to others. If it is to be assumed in the 
instant case that the State, by the action of the Commission 
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in approving the proposed tariff is reducing or impairing 
an obligation, it is only reducing or impairing the obliga. 
tion which a third party owes to one of its instrumentalities , 
namely, the municipality of Ogden; and this situation is 
identical with the one which would exist if the State were 
reducing the obligation of the third party to the State itself. 
See: 
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans WateT 
Works Co., 142 U. S. 79, 35 L. Ed 943; 
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 169, 52 L. Ed. 
151; 
W or chester v. Wore hester Consolidated Street 
R. Co., 196 U. S. 539, 49 L. Ed. 591; 
City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. 
et al., 250 U. S. 394, 63 L. Ed. 1054; 
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 67 L. Ed. 
937. 
The City in effect concedes this rule of law but seeks 
to avoid its application upon two grounds. It first advances 
the theory that although the City may be bound by the 
application of the rule, its inhabitants are not and cites 
Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856. 
This case holds that a court will, under certain circum-
stances, pierce the corporate veil, particularly where a cor-
poration is utilized as a subterfuge to defeat public con-
venience, to justify wrong, or to perpetrate fraud. We are 
unable to perceive how that decision is in point here. In 
I 
any event, the facts in support of such a contention were 
very much stronger in the case of Salt Lake City et al. v. 
,,! 
1 
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Utah Light & Traction Co., supra, for in that case the fran-
chise ordinance provided for the issuance of so-called com-
mutation tickets, which permitted transportation at a re-
duced rate, which rate was changed and raised by the order 
of the Commission. It was contended that many persons 
built homes in the suburbs of Salt Lake City and along the 
street railway outside of Salt Lake City, relying upon the 
benefit of the cheaper transportation under these commu-
tation tickets, and that the Commission had no power to 
deprive inhabitants of the benefit accruing from this pro-
vision of the franchise. This Court answered such conten-
tion at pages 224 and 225 of the Utah Report, saying in 
part: 
"It is, however, further contended that, because 
the franchise ordinances -provided for the so-called 
commutation tickets and in reliance on them many 
persons have built homes in the suburbs of Salt Lake 
City and along defendant's line of street railway out-
side of Salt Lake City, for that reason the defendant 
should be held to be estopped fr.om increasing the 
rates of fare without the consent of those persons. 
It needs no argument to show that the elements of 
estoppel are lacking in this case. A conclusive an-
swer to the contention, however, is that any one who 
purchased commutation tickets and who built a home 
did so subject to the right of the state to change or 
alter the fares fixed in the franchise ordinances in 
case it was found that such fares were unfair or 
--' unreasonable." 
~f:}; 
The second contention of the City is that in 1951 it 
~--adopted the "Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City," 
;../ 
. pursuant to the provisions of Article XI, Section 5, of the 
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Utah Constitution, and thereby enjoys constitutional pro-
tection which it might not otherwise have. The ready and 
conclusive answer to this argument is found in the section 
itself, which provides in part that 
"* * * this grant of authority shall not in-
clude the power to regulate public utilities, not mu-
nicipally owned, if any such regulation of public util-
ities is provided for by general law, nor be deemed 
to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in 
matters relating to state affairs, to enact general 
laws applicable alike to all cities of the State." 
The general law for the regulation of utilities in this State 
is found in said Title 76, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and 
in the provisions of Sections 76-4-1 and 76-4-4 of that 
title as relates to the case at bar. 
It appears that contentions substantially the same as 
here made by the City were urged by Elmhurst in the case 
of City of Elmhurst v. Western Gas Co., supra. In dispos-
ing of such contentions, at page 492 of the Northeastern 1 
Report, the Supreme Court of Illinois said: 
"There is no interference with the contract cre-
ated by the original franchise and acceptance thereof 
by the predecessor of the appellee, and the order of 
the commission in nowise contravenes the constitu-
tional inhibition against the impairment of con-
tracts." 
The contentions of the City under its Points numbered 
5, 6 and 7 are therefore without merit. 
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IV. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION FIXES 
RATES; IT IMPOSES NO TAX OF ANY KIND 
ON THE TELEPHONE CUSTOMER. 
Under this Point, defendant will deal with the argu-
ment advanced by the City in its Point 8, wherein the City 
contends that the order of the Commission in effect unlaw-
fully transforms a franchise fee exacted from the Company 
into a purchase, sales or use tax on the users of telephone 
service. 
The determination of the question here raised requires 
· consideration again of the essential nature of the Company's 
proposal and the Commission's order. 
The City seems unwilling to face these simple, inexor-
- able facts: The Company is obligated to pay the municipal 
- levy to the City. Nothing in the order of the Commission 
has in any manner released the Company from that duty 
:- or impaired the measure of the obligation. Neither in sub-
stance nor form will that duty be changed. The Company 
fully intends to pay this imposition and the accounting prac-
-
" tice before and after the order will be the same. This is 
made abundantly clear by the testimony of the witness 
Sawyer (R. 161-62). 
The only source of company revenue for the payment 
of taxes is from its customers. Regardless of how this 
::; burden may be apportioned or distributed, it will fall upon 
the user of telephone service. The charges which the Com .. 
pany may make to its telephone customers and the revenue 
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which the Company receives must and may only be reflected 
in rates filed with and approved by the Commission. Al-
though the money which the Company would collect from 
the inhabitants of Ogden would put the Company in funds 
with which to pay taxes to the City, it is not taxes which 
the Company receives from the customer but revenue for 
service, which must be treated by the Company in its ac-
counting like any other revenue which it receives. Of this 
there was no doubt, either in the mind of the Commission 
or of the Company. The following questioning of Mr. Saw-
yer by Mr. Thain (R. 161) makes this clear: 
"Q. In other words, all of the tax which you 
will bill will in effect become a revenue? That is, 
it will be credited to the revenue account of the Com-
pany? 
''A. Yes." 
The decision of the Commission is equally clear through 
the use of the following language (R. 33): 
"The tariff affects only the source of revenue 
for the discharge of these taxes. This involves di-
rectly the matter of rates. Ogden City has jurisdic-
tion over its municipal franchise. This Commission 
has jurisdiction over the rates of Mou.ntain States." 
The City appears never to have perceived this point. Its 
failure to do so is demonstrated in the cross-examination 
of Mr. Sawyer by Mr. Thatcher in connection with the 
billing to governmental agencies (R. 141-42), where Mr. 
Sawyer endeavors to make clear to Mr. Thatcher the exact 
nature of the relationship between the Company and its 
customers as follows : 
4 
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"Q. In your investigations have you considered 
whether or not if you bill it as a separate tax as ap-
proved or as proposed that will have to be eliminated 
for all bills for telephone service to the Federal Gov-
ernment? 
"A. No, it won't be. This is a fluctuation of 
our rate structure in these towns to take care of this 
expense, and as such the Government-all govern-
ment accounts will be subject to this charge, they 
will not be exempt from it. This is a rate-this is a 
rate to take care of a tax expense on the Telephone 
Company and will be adjusted in our rate schedules 
in these towns in the amounts indicated here, so 
that the Federal Government would be subject to 
the same rates as any other customers, so far as this 
is concerned." 
Had the City perceived that rates and revenue are in-
volved in the relationship between the customer and the 
Company, it would have understood readily that the Gov-
ernment, like any ·other customer, must pay a published 
rate. 
Once these propositions are fully understood, the an-
. swer to the contentions of the City under this Point become 
: obvious. There has been no transfer of tax from the Com-
:: pany to the telephone customer. The relation between 'the 
:Company and the customer, strictly and accurately speak-
:; ing, does not involve tax. That relationship involves rates 
/and revenue, and the money which the Company would 
_,.collect from the inhabitants of the City would be taken into 
~;and only into the revenue accounts of the Company. With 
:; that revenue the Company would be enabled to meet its 
municipal levy to Ogden. But the treatment of this revenue 
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in the accounting of the Company would be no different 
than the treatment of any other revenue which it might 
receive. 
It is clear that the Commission cannot engage in the 
field of taxation. It is equally clear, however, that in the 
regulation of rates, the Commission may enable the Com-
pany to obtain revenue to pay taxes which are levied upon 
it. If the proposed tariff is finally disapproved, then in all 
future rate adjustments of the Company revenues from 
basic state-wide rates must be provided sufficient in amount 
to enable the Company to pay these municipal levies. Thus, 
under any concept, the recovery of money to pay these 
muniCipal levies is a rate matter for consideration of the 
Commission. 
It appears that the Supreme Court of Washington in 
State v. Department of Public Service, supra, was met with 
the same argument as now advanced by the City, and in 
disposing of it, at page 535 of the Pacific Reporter, said: 
"There is no basis for the argument advanced 
by the cities to the effect that the department is 
seeking to exercise the taxing power, or to interfere 
with the exercise of that power by the cities. The 
only question concerns the allocation of the moneys 
paid by respondent to the cities under a taxing or· 
dinance or pursuant to franchise provisions, whether 
these payments will be included in respondent's gen· 
eral operating expenses or segregated and passed to , 
the rate payers in the respective municipal corpora· 
tions to which the moneys are paid." I 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence supports the order of the Commission. 
The order is within the jurisdiction of the Commission over 
rates, charges and practices of the Company. It contra-
venes no constitutional prohibition. It is reasonable and 
valid and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company. 
AKOLT, CAMPBELL, TURNQUIST 
&SHEPHERD, 
Of Counsel. 
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